IFRI researcher Alain Antil: « Terrorism issue in Sahel seems to hide other questions”

Alain Antil is recognised as one of the new figures of direct, objective and « field » analysis. He is in charge of the Sub-Saharan Africa program at the IFRI. He teaches at Lille’s Political Studies Institute and at the Superior technical Institute Overseas (ISTOM). Alain Antil obtained his doctorate thesis in political geography at the University of Rouen. His expertise fields are: Mauritania, Sahel, West Africa, political and social issues, security / terrorism.

• How do consider Al-Qaeda’s evolution in North Africa and its upsurge in the Sahel?
•  
• Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb remains a phenomenon, if we expect its Saharan branch, mainly Algerian. That means outside my expertise zone which is the Sahel.
• There is a little work on AQIM’s Saharan branch. Currently, the main publications we may see consist in security expert’s works which are limited in repeating what everyone says and news stories. The most informed newspapers are the Algerian ones. However, the most informed stories take their information from security forces. So, we have to wonder about the reason for which on a given time a given department reveals such information. This small preamble is totally necessary to understand that we know few things about what is happening in the Sahara and there is a problem of sources. If we look at those stories along with Sahelian countries’ media publications, we can though transmit some ideas which will not certainly be scoops: – the number of the combatants of AQIM’s Saharan branch has been decreasing for the last few years (Low estimates say 150 men); -Relative financial independence (i.e. action) of this branch or this “emirate” comparing to the rest of the organisation; – Relative autonomy of different groups (katibas) which make up AQIM’s Saharan branch; – Since we can legitimately raise questions about the Islamist qualitative of certain members of those groups (most of the specialists, for example, agree on saying the famous Mokhtar Belmokhtar is a highwayman more than being an ideologue); – among the members of AGIM’s Saharan branch, there has been percentage of Sub-Saharan nationals mainly Sahelians for the last few years. Among them, Mauritanians seem to be the most numerous (Algerians remain majority though); – Finally, the presence of this “threat” justifies alliances and alliances re-making up (I mean security cooperation of course). It would be difficult to justify that without the existence of this threat which suits a lot of people in a certain way.
• Yet, this threat did not remain a theory as violent acts have been perpetrated in Sahelian territories for the last five years (abductions, attacks on militaries, killings of Westerners, suicide attack). Of them, the most serious ones were carried out in Mauritania. We will see if those acts continue but I would like to mention that terrorism issue does not appear to be the most important question for Mauritania, Niger and Mali in terms of security point of view. Smuggling issue is the one which destabilises more nations. Though, this is less reported by Medias.
•  
•  How do you assess Bamako’s trouble game between Algeria’s security requirements and France’s diplomatic game in the Camatte issue, for example?
•  
• It would be tempting for Algeria to denounce Mali’s laxity. We must not ignore that the Malian army is one of the smallest armies in the region. Having control over a 1 million square kilometres-territory with more than 5000 troops men is not an easy mission. Concerning the issue you raised, I do not have much more information than the crossed imprecations between Mauritania, Algeria and Mali on the Pierre Camatte issue. It seems that France put friendly pressure so that Mali would release AGIM’s members to take back its hostage. Generally speaking, most of the Western countries got used to accept the conditions of hostage-takers. This contributes to create a real market. More exactly, we saw that outlaws sold their “commodities” to AQIM in certain kidnappings. The only Westerners who rejected any negotiations were the British. They saw their hostage being executed.
• Mali tries to find autonomy margins by multiplying security cooperation. This is the weak strategy against the strong.
•  
• Can security cooperation in the region be efficient? Do the US want to play the role via Africom? Why? Challenges are various. The monkey business of Western intelligence may not become an additional burden?
•  
•  
• Security cooperation can be efficient if the region’s nations and their exterior partners exchange information. Algeria, France and the US should be allied more. Who is the most legitimate to help Mali in assuring control over its territory? I would say, maybe naively, that it is up to Malians to answer that question.
•  
• Is the absence of local efficient development mainly in the regions of North Niger, from Mali-Kidal to Tin Zawaten and Mauritania- Lemgheity to Zouérate, another source of turbulences which have been hitting the region since 1991?
•  
• First of all, a certain number of prejudgments must be deconstructed. All the empirical studies about the world’s regions show that there is no obvious correlation between poverty and political violence or poverty and terrorism. They are, otherwise, more complex explanations and not simple determinisms. Regarding the Sahel or the Sahelo-Saharan zone, the most concerning violent political phenomena have been the 1990 and 2000’s Nigerian, Malian and Touareg crises since 1991. Even if it is a frozen conflict, the settlement of the Western Sahara issue would enable to ease tension in the entire zone.
•  
• Speaking about Mauritania, we can not say the North is disadvantaged comparing to the rest of the country. For Mali and Niger, it is obvious that weak investment in northern the country, an imperfect decentralisation, and, for the Niger, a problematic repartition of private incomes are chronic claims of the North’s populations mainly the Touaregs.
•  
• That means the south of those two countries is not El Dorado and the Touaregs’ claims are, in fact, deeper. Those populations have never been accepted to be in countries dominated by African people. They call it “the second colonisation”. Don’t forget that North African country Libya used to play a negative role in those issues.
•  
•  Algeria looks for setting up an operational military unit made up of many armies of the African Union’s countries. This unit will be provided with large means and prerogatives to fight terrorism. This orientation thwarted the American wish to impose an Africom in due form. How will things evolve in this region which interests powers strategies?
• We need to hail the Algerian initiative with the creation of this command in Tamanrasset. Setting up joint patrols with the right to chase beyond national borders is a positive thing. We will have to judge results. Concerning Africom, I do not think that this American command, already operational and based in Stuttgart, is related to this zone only but the entire African continent. The Algerian creation did not get rid of the TSCTI and will not prevent security cooperation enhancement between Sahelian countries and the European Union.